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Copper State Leasing Company (hereinafter "Copper 
State"), hereby responds to arguments raised in the Brief of 
Respondents filed herein. 
Because of certain misstatements and mischaracteri-
zations of fact contained in the Brief of Respondents, much 
of Copper State's Reply Brief will concentrate upon setting 
before the Court a more clear statement of facts, all of 
which is supported by the record on appeal. In addition to 
clarifying the factual background of this appeal, the 
appropriate standard for Summary Judgment applicable to this 
case is also discussed. 
POINT I 
RESPONDENTS HAVE MISSTATED AND MISCHARACTERIZED 
IMPORTANT FACTS MATERIAL TO THE ISSUES ON APPEAL 
In their statement of facts, and indeed throughout 
the Brief of Respondents, Respondents have misstated or 
inaccurately portrayed facts which are material to the 
determination of the issues here involved. Although not all 
such misstatements or mischaracterizations can be discussed 
herein, Copper State herein sets forth three examples of 
such: 
A. Copper State's Relationship with Gray and Graven. 
On Page 1 of Respondent's Brief, they state the 
following: 
4 
(1) "Copper State ••.. had been contacted by 
Gray and Graven on several occasions and had explained 
to them in detail the program referred to as the 
Arbitrage System •.. The purpose of the meetings with 
Copper State by Gray and Graven was not only to have 
them understand every step of the Arbitrage Program, but 
to have them become the leasing entity of computers with 
their numerous investors who would be leasing the 
computers." 
(2) "Although other leasing companies were 
checked on by Gray and Graven, they seem (sic) to settle 
upon and deal with Copper State as they had done 
business numerous times with Copper State and they had a 
verbal agreement with them, that if people qualified, 
the lease (sic) would be consummated." 
On Pages 2 and 3 of their Brief, Respondents state: 
(1) "The Blackers were told ..• that Copper 
State was involved in the [Arbitrage] Program." 
(2) "It was not until approximately six 
months after the leases were executed by Blackers that 
Copper State informed Blackers that Gray and Graven were 
not paying the lease payments ..." 
On Page 21 of their Brief, Respondents state: 
(1) "Copper State had been contacted several 
times by Gray and Graven and had explained to them every 
step of the Arbitrage Program and in addition, Copper 
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State anticipated becoming the leasing entity of 
computers with (sic) Gray and Gravin's numerous 
investors.If 
(2) "Gray and Graven also had done business 
numerous times with Copper State and the verbal 
commitment was reached with them that if people 
qualified, the lease would be consummated." 
The above-recited facts are, in some cases, 
misstated and in other cases without support in record. 
These "facts" are utilized in an attempt to show that a 
substantial relationship existed between Copper State and 
Gray and Graven in order to create an agency relationship. 
The facts, as stated by Respondents, are simply not borne out 
by the record, and a more full and fair reading of the record 
would in no way support this assarted agency relationship 
between Copper State and Gray and Graven. 
Although Gray and Graven had presented to Copper 
State the "Arbitrage Program" and solicited Copper State's 
involvement therein, they were clearly told by 
representatives of Copper State that Copper State would not 
lease computers to any individuals or business entities 
solely for the Arbitrage Program, but would lease them only 
to qualified applicants using the computers in the ordinary 
course of their business activity. (TT-125-2 6). Copper 
State had not, and did not intend to "participate" or be 
"involved" in the Arbitrage Program. (TT-125-26). Copper 
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State was not "the leasing entity" for Gray and Graven's 
"numerous investors", and, indeed, as pointed out in the 
Brief of Respondents, it executed only one other lease with 
anyone involved with Gray and Graven, which lease was 
entirely separate and apart from any transaction having to do 
with Respondents. (Depo. of Steven Beckstead - 7.) The 
statement that Copper State had done business with "numerous" 
of the Gray and Graven investors is simply not true, nor 
supported by the record. 
Other statements of "fact" contained in the Brief 
of Respondents insinuate that Copper State "intended" or 
"anticipated" certain results or the occurrence of certain 
events. There is no basis in the record, whatsoever, to 
support Respondents1 characterization of what Copper State 
intended or anticipated. For Respondents to ascribe to 
Copper State certain intentions or anticipations, without 
support from the record, is disingenuous. 
As set forth in the Brief of Copper State, Gray and 
Graven were acting as the agents of the Blackers when they 
brought the Blackers to Copper State to transact business. 
(Brief of Appellant - 32-35.) Copper State did not dispatch 
Gray and Graven to find individuals or businesses interested 
in leasing equipment. (Depo. of Steven Beckstead - 6). Any 
attempt by Respondents to paint an agency relationship 
between Copper State and Gray and Graven is simply 
unsupportable on the facts. 
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B. The Gray and Graven-Cowboy Computer Relationship, 
On Page 4 of their Brief, Respondents state the 
following: 
(1) "Copper State, furthermore was aware that 
the money they paid over to Gray and Graven, made out to 
Cowboy Computer, was for the purpose of (sic) Gray and 
Graven to obtain the computers from Data General, and 
that Cowboy Computer was not the actual supplier, even 
though the name of the supplier of the computers was 
left off of the leases." 
(2) "... Copper State knew that the computer 
equipment was not there (with Gray and Graven and Cowboy 
Computer), and that it would be some time before the 
computer equipment would be there." 
The above-recited statements imply that Copper 
State was aware that Cowboy Computer was owned and/or 
manipulated by Gray and Graven, and that Copper State knew 
that the computers had never been ordered from Data General, 
the computer manufacturer. Such an implication is, again, 
unsupportable from the record. In fact, the record shows 
that Copper State received two invoices from Cowboy 
Computers, and acted upon the assumption and representation 
that the computers had been ordered from Data General. 
(Depo. of Steven Beckstead - 8-10). The record also reflects 
that the computers were actually ordered from Data General. 
(TT - 27-28; Depo. of John Gray - 20). Copper State had no 
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knowledge that Cowboy Computers was owned and operated by 
Gray and/or Graven. 
From Copper State's perspective, Cowboy Computer 
was the "supplier" of the computer equipment and Data General 
was the manufacturer of the equipment. (TT-132-33; Depo. of 
Steven Beckstead - 8-10, 12). Respondents, as well as Copper 
State, were informed by Gray and Graven that the computers 
would not be ready for shipment by Data General for a period 
of approximately 90 days. This disclosure was made by Gray 
and Greiven virtually simultaneously to both parties. 
Moreover, the Blackers and Gray and Graven unitedly 
approached Copper State for early disbursement of the lease 
proceeds based upon the representation to Copper State that 
Data General would not begin production of the computers 
until all or part of the lease proceeds were paid to them. 
(TT-75-77; Depo. of James Blacker - 31). This united request 
for early disbursement served as the basis for the 
modification of the lease documents outlined in detail in the 
Brief of Appellant herein. 
C. Blackers Knowledge of the Diversion of Funds. 
On Page 5 of their Brief, Respondents state that 
"the Blackers at no time authorized, or knew of, the Copper 
State money to go (sic) into the said interim investment [the 
Vasilocopolous diamond scheme]" and that "at the time 
Blackers discovered that Gray and Graven had used Copper 
State's money in the diamond investment, Blackers asked 
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whether Copper State was aware of this fact, and Gray and 
Graven responded that they were. Thus, Blackers did not say 
anything to Copper State about it." 
The record clearly supports, based upon admissions 
by the Blackers themselves, the fact that the Blackers 
discovered the lease proceeds had been diverted to the 
vasilocopolous diamond scheme within approximately two months 
of the diversion. (TT-88, 120; Depo. of James Blacker -
40-45; Depo. of John Gray - 15, 31, 34). Notwithstanding 
this knowledge, the record also shows that the Blackers took 
no action to inform Copper State that the lease proceeds had 
been diverted. (TT-91-92, 120, 137). As demonstrated above, 
the Blackers admit as much in their Brief* Thus, the 
Blackers knew approximately four months before Copper State 
was informed that the lease proceeds disbursed by Copper 
State had be diverted by Gray and Graven into the 
Vasilocopolous diamond scheme. Notwithstanding their 
knowledge, the Blackers failed to inform Copper State of that 
fact. 
The above-cited examples of misstatements and 
mischaracterizations of fact in Respondents1 Brief bring all 
statements of fact contained therein into question, including 
the restated or abbreviated statements of fact found on Pages 
14 and 15 of their Brief. The latter are especially 
questionable, since they contain absolutely no citations to 
the record. This Court should either disregard or review 
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with suspicion all statements of fact found in the Brief of 
Respondents in order to cull the errors therefrom. 
POINT II 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT WAS ERRONEOUSLY GRANTED 
IN THIS CASE BECAUSE NUMEROUS FACTUAL 
ISSUES REMAINED TO BE TRIED 
Under Point I, Section B of the Brief of Appellant, 
Copper State points out eight distinct issues of material 
fact which existed before the lower court at the time Summary 
Judgment was granted and which in and of themselves would 
preclude the entry of Summary Judgment in this case. In 
their Brief, however, Respondents claim that lf[t]here were no 
material factual issues involved or disputed at the hearing 
..." (Brief of Respondents - 8 ) . In support of this 
contention, Respondents rely principally upon the fact that 
both parties had filed motions for summary judgment at the 
time of the hearing. Citing Mastic Tile Division of Ruberoid 
Co. v. Acme Distributing Co., 15 Ut.2d 136, 389 P.2d 56 
(19 64), Repondents argue that this Court should rule, as a 
matter of law, that the filing of cross motions for summary 
judgment resolves all possible issues of material fact before 
the trial court. Such an argument is clearly contrary to 
law. Although both parties in Mastic Tile had filed cross 
motions for summary judgment, the parties had essentially 
submitted the same facts to the court, and the court was left 
only with a determination of law. The only "issue" involved 
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in Mastic Tile, was the interpretation of unambiguous 
language contained in certain documents. Thus, no issues of 
material fact existed in Mastic Tile to preclude the entry of 
summary judgment. 
In this case, contrary to Mastic Tile, numerous 
issues of material fact existed at the time of the hearing 
before the lower court. Although the interpretation of 
documents, as in Mastic Tile, was before the trial court in 
this case, issues of fact regarding the intent of the 
parties, as well as other significant questions had to be 
resolved before the lower court could determine the meaning 
of such documents. At the hearing before the lower court, 
counsel for Copper State recited the facts relied upon by 
Copper State to support its motion. Counsel for Slackers did 
likewise. Even the most cursory review of those factual 
statements and positions would reveal substantial disputes as 
to material facts. Thus, one of the difference between this 
case and Mastic Tile is that the statements of fact advanced 
by the parties are materially different, giving rise to 
obvious issues of fact to be decided at trial. 
The majority rule, as pointed out by the annotation 
cited by Respondents in their Brief, 3 6 ALR 2d 881, is that 
the mere filing of cross motions for summary judgment does 
not conclusively establish that there is no issue of material 
fact, but that the trial court must independently determine 
whether there exists a genuine issue of material fact, and 
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rule accordingly. Id. 883-85. While in some cases the 
filing of cross motions for summary judgment can be viewed to 
be an admission by each party that no issues of material fact 
exist between them, these cases are limited to those in which 
both parties submit facts which are essentially the same, 
thereby admitting, at least as to those facts, there is no 
issue to be resolved. Id. at 885-887. 
The genuine issues of material facts before the 
trial court at the time of hearing, as pointed out in the 
Brief of Appellant, should have been obvious to the lower 
court and precluded the entry of summary judgment for either 
party. The Court would have hardly had to perform a 
"microscopic inspection" of the record to find issues of fact 
sufficient to preclude summary judgment. Indeed, even the 
existence of one genuine issue of material fact will preclude 
summary judgment. Frisbee v. K&K Construction Co., 676 P.2d 
387, 390 (Utah 1984). 
The Utah Supreme Court held in Frisbee v. K&K 
Construction Co., 676 P.2d 387 (Utah 1984), that the 
existence of an ambiguity in a written instrument, in and of 
itself, may render summary judgment inappropriate. Id. at 
390. In Frisbee, the Court was called upon to determine 
whether language in an addendum to an agreement was intended 
by the parties to modify payment terms under an agreement. 
The Court found that the question of the intent of the 
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parties, being a factual question by its nature, rendered 
summary judgement inappropriate. See also Faulkner v. 
Farnsworth, 665 P.2d 1292, 1293 (Utah 1983). 
As in Frisbee, many of the factual issues in this 
case revolv around the interpretation of the language 
inserted in the lease documents by the Blackers, under the 
supervision of Graven, and their intent in inserting said 
language. The existence of these issues, alone, should 
preclude the entry of summary judgment under the rules laid 
down by this Court in Frisbee and Faulkner. As this Court 
has held, summary judgment should be entered against a party 
only when, viewing the facts in the light most favorable to 
that party, there is "no reasonably possibility the party 
moved against could prevail." Utah State University of 
Agriculture and Applied Science v. Sutro & Co., 646 P.2d 715, 
720 n.14 (Utah 1982). 
In this case, the trial court erred in granting 
summary judgment given the existence of numerous issues of 
material fact and because a clear and unresolved ambiguity in 
the lease documents. Summary Judgment entered by the trial 
court should be reversed, and the case remanded for trial as 
to the first cause of action. 
CONCLUSION 
In their Brief, Respondents have misstated and 
inaccurately portrayed facts which are material to the 
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determination of the issues herein. Examples of such 
misstatements have been pointed out by Copper State in an 
effort to lay before this Court a more clear picture of the 
factual context underlying this case. The misstatements 
pointed out by Copper State are serious enough to bring into 
question all characterizations of fact contained in the Brief 
of Respondents. The Court should view with suspicion all 
such staitements of fact, and insure that all facts as set 
forth by Respondents are adequately supported by the record. 
In addition, the lower court erroneously granted summary 
judgment in the face of material factual issues which should 
have precluded the entry of summary judgment. The mere fact 
that both parties filed cross motions for summary judgment 
does not, as a matter of law, compel the conclusion that no 
factual issues remained for trial. This is especially true 
where each party cites a different set of facts and relies 
upon those facts in seeking summary judgment. Moreover, the 
existence of an ambiguity in the core lease documents should, 
alone, preclude the entry of summary judgment against Copper 
State. , 
Respectfully submitted this /-— day of March, 
1986. 
ALLEN NELSON HARDY & EVANS 
Michael L. Dowd 1 e^ /lETsq. 
Attorneys for Appteiaant 
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